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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

WESLEY WAYNE AUSTIN,

REPLY BRIEF

Defenant/Appellant.

Wesley Wayne Austin, Appellant, prose on appeal, replys to the respondent's
based on findings of fact and conclusions of law, fully settled.

Respondent is

relying on his "rephrasing'of the issues to mislead this Court with misdirection
and concealment.

Respndent has not responded to the issues presented in the instant

case.
ISSUE ONE:
Respondent wants to play word games with the transcript and the Judgment and
Conviviction Order dated April 16, 2001.

Respondent claims that spoken words prev-

ail over the written words in the Judgment and Conviction Order.

The respondent

uses Rule 36 to support his agument, but conceals the statute that prevails over
the rule.

Idaho Code 19-2513 states in pertinent part; "the Court shall set forth

in its judgment and sentence the minimum period of confinement and the subsquent
· d e t erm1na
· t e per1·oo .•. " In the sentencing transcripts of April 16, 2001 Judge
1n

Shindurling ambiguously states twice; "As to Count XXI you will serve a minimum of
and a maximum of three years." There is no specfic indeterminate amount stated in
the trascript as is mandatory by the language of 19-2513.

The Court then goes on

eight times stating;" A~ to Count XXIV, a minimum of two and a maximum of three
years." Now the Court does not state a specfic minimum period of incarceration.
Respectfully the appellant asks "two what?" Tue days, two weeks, two months? What?
Now we have played the word games of the respondent. It is quite clear from the
transcripts that the voice words are ambiguous, thus making the sentence illegal.
An illegal sentence must be corrected and in the presence of the defendant, pursuant
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to Idaho Code 19-2503 and Idaho Criminal Rule 43(a).

The law has been well settled

by this Court with the rulings in State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, (1983),
State, 108 Idaho 394, and in State v. Money, 109 Idaho 757 (1985).

Lopez v.

We read in Money

(supra) "It is entirely irrelevant that Money's presence might have had little effect on the outcome." This clearly set forths the inent of this Court that the defendant must be afforded all of his Due Process rights.

In the interest of justice

and not some word games, the appellant must be resentenced and be present at those
proceedings.
Further evidence that the appellant has an illegal sentence, is Judge Shindurlings declaration in the Rule 35 hearing of June 20, 2014, (See Rule 35 hearing Trancripts, pages 16 and 17) where we read; "The sentence that was voiced in the original
Judgment in April had the two to five sentence on each count, which was an illegal
sentence under the charges that were brought." Judge Shindurling goes on to say;
that he corrected the illegal sentence sua sponte with out motion to trigger the
correction, on October 19, 2001.

This brings issue as to the accuracy of the tran-

scripts and why the appellant was denied acces to the transcripts when his due diligence started.

After all this case is full of attorneys not reporting illegal

exparte hearings, elected officials polical influence in this sentence, and the
distruction of exhibits in 2008, with District Court approval, just to name a few
of the infractions surrounding this case.
respond.

All of which the respondent did not

(See sentencing transcripts page 10, Lines 20 thru 25)

This is yet another

indication of the evidence that the sentence was to follow the plea agreement and
the illegal ex parte communication with not only an elected official, but an alledged victim.

Idaho Rules of Professinal Conduct are very clear on reporting judicial

misconduct by other attorneys.

( I.R.P.C. 8.3)

to this issue.
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Respondent has failed to respond

ISSUE TWO: WAS 1HE PLEA AGREEMENT MADE WI1H 1HE DEFENDANT BINDING UPON 1HE PARTIES?
Respondent failed to respond to the crux of this appeal.
upon the parties then the agreement has been breached.

If it was not binding

Reasonable minds without

playing word games, would come to the same conclusion as Mr. Hendricks, assistant
prosecutor for Bingham County at the Rule 35 hearing stated in reference to the
plea agreement;" Looking at it it looks like there was a binding one and I too have
looked at the transcripts." (See Rule 35 hearing page 23, Lines 5,6, and 7)

Even if

by some strange way of analysis of fact and law, that it was not binding upon the
District Court, it was sure binding upon the prosecution and the State of Idaho.
The United States Supreme Court in Puckett v. United States,

566 U.S. 129 (2009)

referenced L Ed Digest 59, 60.5,where we~_read; _ . "'- -·= ::.
"Plea bargains are essentially contracts. When the consideration for a contract
fails-that is, when one of the exchanged promises is not kept-the court does not say
that the voluntary bilateral consent to the contract was broken. The party injured
by the breach will generally be entitled to some remedy, which might include the
right to rescind the contract entirely; but that is not the same thing as saying the
contract was never validly concluded. When a defendant agrees to a plea bargain,
the government takes on certain obligations. If those obligations are not met, the
defendant is entitled to seek a remedy, which might in some cases be rescission of
the agreement, allowing him to take back the consideration he has furnished, that
is, to withdraw his plea. But rescission is not the only possible remedy; in
Santobello, the United States Supreme Court allowed for a resentencing at which the
government would fully comply with the agreement-in effect, specific performance of
the contract. In any case, it is entirely clear that a breach does not cause the
guilty plea, when entered, to have been unknowing or involuntary. It is precisely
because the plea was knowing and voluntary (and hence valid) that the government
· is obligated to uphold its side of the bargain. (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts,
Ch. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburt, Breyer and Alita, JJ."
Santobello v

New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), is very clear. "THat when a

guilty plea rested in significant degree on a promise of the prosecutor, so that
it could be said to be part of the inducement, such promise must be fulfilled, and
that the state court!s affirrnance of the conviction was improperin the case at bar,
it being irrmaterial that the breach of agreement by the prosecution was inadvertent,
and (2) in expressing the view of four of the seven members of the court, that the
case should be remanded to the state court to decide whether the circumstances of
the agreement on the plea, with the defendant being resentenced before a different
judge, or whether the relief sought by the defendant as to withdrawing his guilty
plea should be granted.
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The respondant in the instant case wants this court to review the plea colloquy
to see if the plea was given voluntarily and willingly.

This procedure under Rule

11 binds the parties to the plea agreement, pursuant to the historic rulings of
Santobello (supra) and Puckett (supra).
the plea agreement.
lines 1 and 2)

So when Judge Shindurling deletes words in

(See change of plea transcripts page 9 Lines 21-25, page 10

While explaining to the appellant he leaves out reference to binding

on the court and Rule 11(d)(1)(D) f~~thering his violation of oath of office.

This

was done to structure a sentence to satisfy the people that put tremendous pressure
on Judge Shindurling through political influence and corruption.

However appellant

concedes his plea was willing and voluntary and he fully understood the agreemeni,
as it was written and explained by defense counsel.
and without ambiguity.

The language was plain, clear

Paragraphs 1 and 12 of the plea agreement are very clear

and the appellant in open court says he understands the agreement.

However the

Judge mistates the agreement many times as it is clear from the record to structure
a sentence influenced by elected officials.

This made the plea agreement binding

on the Court as well as the state and appellant.

Yet to date the only one com-

pelled to abide by the plea agreement has been the appellant.

Even if by some

strange definition that the court was not bound, the State of Idaho is.

The

breach of the plea agreement by the State started in the plea colloquy when they
remained silent.

The State furthered its berach by remaining silent at sentencing.

Which leads one to believe that more ex parte meetings and communications were
held.

The time of the breach of plea agreement is the time the agreement becomes

void.

The State's inducement and promise to the appellant in exchange for his

guilty plea was to run the sentences concurrent.as stated twice in paragraphs 1
and 12 in the plea agreement.
Additionally the Court did not accept the plea agreement as written.and the
Court must give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea.
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It is clear

from the record that did not happen.
The State as well as the Court breached the Plea Agreement from its inception
and constitutes an illegal sentence.
This case has not been the garden variety litigation.

One question that will

arrise is "Why did the Defendant/Appellant take so long to contest his sentence?"
The asnswer is given to all concerned in Defense Counsel Parmenter's letter to the
Prosecuting Attorney Scott Andrew.

(See attached exhibit 1) Mr. Parmenter knew

and understood what the agreement was and what the Appellant understood.
Appellant is not able to obtain copies of his Presentence Reports of his
federal convictions.

However both state in the Criminal History portion, 3 year

suspended sentence.for the State of Idaho.
Probation and Parole.

This information was requested by U.S.

The request was directed at the District Court.
REMEDY REQUESTED

Appellant respectfully requests specific performance of his plea agreement of

2001.

It has been 4 years since the warrant for the alledged probation violation.

The State of Idaho, Bingham County and the District Court have abused their power
of authority by not having a probation revocation hearing in a reasonable time.
Appellant has had two other hearings via telephone, Why not a probation revocation
hearing?
Appellant has never asked for anything but what he agreed in his Plea of Guilty.
The State can play word games, in which they fail due to their not reading the
Statute 19-2513 that overrules the Rule 36.
Specifically Appellant requests the following remedy:

1.

Remand this proceeding back to the District Court to correct the illegal
sentence with Appellant present.

2.

Instruct the District Court to sentence Appellant pursuant to the
Appellant's written Plea Agreement, which is pleading guilty to 10 counts
of violation of 18-3106 with a maximum sentence of 3 years with all
counts to run concurrently.

3.

Suspend the sentence and place Appellant on 3 years of probation pursuant
to 20-222.
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4.

Probation to terminate April 16, 2004.

5.

All warrants, detainers,,~olds, etc. must be quashed with prejudice
immediately.

CONCLUSION
In the interest of Justice, Appellant respectfully requests his Appeal and
Remedy be granted.
Respectfully sutmitted,

Wesley Wayne Austin
Pro-Se on Appeal.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 21 day of August, 2014, the foregoing reply
brief was entered in a
Attorney General
PO Box 0010
Boise, ID 83720-0010

true and coreect copy served upon the parties listed below.

David N. Parmenter & Associates
Attorneys at Law
53 S. Shilling
P.O. Box 700
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221

David N. Parmenter, Esq
Nathan D. Rivera, Esq.

FAX (208) 785-4858
E-MAIL

parlaw@gmail.com

Telephone
(208) 785-5618

August 31, 2011
Scott Andrew
Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Maple
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221

RE:

State v. Austin
Our File No.: 00-194

Dear Scott:
I wanted to give you a brief update on Wes Austin.
First, his plea agreement since your office was very specific, had him pleading to 10 counts of check
fraud, with each count carrying a maximum penalty of three years in prison. The agreement, which
was an 11 (c)( 1)(C) which is binding on the court, and provided that each of the counts were to run
concurrently to be suspended. On the day of sentencing, the court ordered that those sentences run
consecutively, and we filed an appeal. As a result of the appeal, the judgment order was later
amended to read that the sentences would run concurrently and not consecutively.

Mr. Austin therefore has a maximum term of three years he served, not 10 years as you may have
otherwise thought. You can check the file to see whether I am correct, but I believe that I am.
He also should have credit for 155 days spent in Bingham County, as well as approximately 14
months in South Dakota after the detainer for the probation violation.

Mr. Austin has no difficulty with pleading and working out an agreement as long as it is concurrent
with his federal time. If he has to come back to Idaho, the most that can be imposed is 36 months
minus time served. Further, he will use his IAD, which means that the State ofldaho must dispose
of the matter in six months or less.
Further, you should be aware that he was recently sentenced in a criminal case in Federal Court in
South Dakota. He received a sentence of 132 months, or 11 years. As you can see from the enclosed
order, he has been ordered to pay restitution of $848,909.48.

Scott Andrew
August 31, 2011

With present budget cuts and constraints, I am not sure that the State ofldaho would be best served
by bringing him back. The State ofldaho has already received more restitution in this case than they
have probably received in any cases on a pro rata basis for the amount owed, and Mr. Austin had
been willing to pay a substantial portion of the debt-which ultimately was not paid over to your
office, because of a handful of the creditors who were unwilling to negotiate.
Please advise and let me know if you really want to pursue the interstate remedies.
Very truly yours,

David N. Parmenter
Jg
cc:

Wes Austin

